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Abstract
Over recent years, devising classification algorithms that are robust to adversarial
perturbations has emerged as a challenging problem. In particular, deep neural
nets (DNNs) seem to be susceptible to small imperceptible changes over test in-
stances. In this work, we study whether there is any learning task for which it is
possible to design classifiers that are only robust against polynomial-time adver-
saries. Indeed, numerous cryptographic tasks (e.g. encryption of long messages)
are only be secure against computationally bounded adversaries, and are indeed
impossible for computationally unbounded attackers. Thus, it is natural to ask if
the same strategy could help robust learning.
We show that computational limitation of attackers can indeed be useful in robust
learning by demonstrating a classifier for a learning task in which computational
and information theoretic adversaries of bounded perturbations have very differ-
ent power. Namely, while computationally unbounded adversaries can attack suc-
cessfully and find adversarial examples with small perturbation, polynomial time
adversaries are unable to do so unless they can break standard cryptographic hard-
ness assumptions. Our results, therefore, indicate that perhaps a similar approach
to cryptography (relying on computational hardness) holds promise for achiev-
ing computationally robust machine learning. We also show that the existence of
such learning task in which computational robustness beats information theoretic
robustness implies (average case) hard problems inNP.
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1 Introduction
Designing classifiers that are robust to small perturbations to test instances has emerged as a chal-
lenging task in machine learning. The goal of robust learning is to design classifiers h that still
correctly predicts the true label even if the input x is perturbed minimally to a “close” instance x′.
In fact, it was shown (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) that many
learning algorithms, and in particular DNNs, are highly vulnerable to such small perturbations and
thus adversarial examples can be successfully found. Since then, the machine learning community
has been actively engaged to address this problem with many new defenses (Papernot et al., 2016;
Madry et al., 2018; Biggio & Roli, 2018) and novel and powerful attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Athalye et al., 2018).
Do adversarial examples always exist? This state of affairs suggest that perhaps the exis-
tence of adversarial example is due to fundamental reasons that might be inevitable. A se-
quence of work (Gilmer et al., 2018; Fawzi et al., 2018; Diochnos et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al.,
2019; Shafahi et al., 2018; Dohmatob, 2018) show that for natural theoretical distributions (e.g.,
isotropic Gaussian of dimension n) and natural metrics over them (e.g., ℓ0, ℓ1 or ℓ2), adversar-
ial examples are inevitable. Namely, the concentration of measure phenomenon (Ledoux, 2001;
Milman & Schechtman, 1986) in such metric probability spaces imply that small perturbations are
enough to map almost all the instances x into a close x′ that is misclassified. This line of work,
however, does not yet say anything about “natural” distributions of interest such as images or voice,
as the precise nature of such distributions are yet to be understood.
Can lessons from cryptography help? Given the pessimistic state of affairs, researchers have
asked if we could use lessons from cryptography to make progress on this problem (Madry,
2018; Goldwasser, 2018; Mahloujifar & Mahmoody, 2018). Indeed, numerous cryptographic tasks
(e.g. encryption of long messages) can only be realized against attackers that are computationally
bounded. In particular, we know that all encryption methods that use a short key to encrypt much
longer messages are insecure against computationally unbounded adversaries. However, when re-
stricted to computationally bounded adversaries this task becomes feasible and suffices for numerous
settings. This insight has been extremely influential in cryptography. Nonetheless, despite attempts
to build on this insight in the learning setting, we have virtually no evidence on whether this approach
is promising. Thus, we ask:
Could we even hope to leverage computational hardness for adversarially robust learning?
Taking a step in realizing this vision, we provide formal definitions for computational variants of
robust learning. Following the cryptographic literature, we provide a game based definition of com-
putationally robust learning. Very roughly, a game-based definition consists of two entities: a chal-
lenger and an attacker, that interact with each other. In our case, as the first step the challenger
generates independent samples from the distribution at hand, use those samples to train a learning
algorithm, and obtain a hypothesis h. Additionally, the challenger samples a fresh challenge sample
x from the underlying distribution. Next, the challenger provides the attacker with oracle access to
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h(·) and x. At the end of this game, the attacker outputs a value x′ to the challenger. The attacker
declares this execution as a “WIN” if x′ is obtained as a small perturbation of x and leads to a mis-
classification. We say that the learning is computationally robust as long as no attacker from a class
of adversaries can “WIN” the above game with a probability much better than some base value. (See
Definition 2.1.)
This definition is very general and it implies various notions of security by restricting to various
classes of attackers. While we focus on polynomially bounded attackers in this paper, we remark
that one may also naturally consider other natural classes of attackers based on the setting of interest
(e.g. an attacker that can only modify certain part of the image).
What if adversarial examples are actually easy to find? Mahloujifar & Mahmoody (2019) stud-
ied this question, and showed that as long as the input instances come from a product distribution,
and if the distances are measured in Hamming distance, adversarial examples with sublinear pertur-
bations can be found in polynomial time. This result, however, did not say anything about other
distributions or metrics such as ℓ∞. Thus, it was left open whether computational hardness could be
leveraged in any learning problem to guarantee its robustness.
1.1 Our Results
From computational hardness to computational robustness. In this work, we show that com-
putational hardness can indeed be leveraged to help robustness. In particular, we present a learning
problem P that has a classifier hP that is only computationally robust. In fact, let Q be any learning
problem that has a classifier with “small” risk α, but that adversarial examples exist for classifier hQ
with higher probability β ≫ α under the ℓ0 norm (e.g.,Q could be any of the well-studied problems
in the literature with a vulnerable classifier hQ under norm ℓ0). Then, we show that there is a “re-
lated” problem P and a related classifier hP that has computational risk (i.e., risk in the presence of
computationally bounded tampering adversaries) at most α, but the risk of hP will go up all the way
to ≈ β if the tampering attackers are allowed to be computationally unbounded. Namely, computa-
tionally bounded adversaries have a much smaller chance of finding adversarial examples of small
perturbations for hP than computationally unbounded attackers do. (See Theorem 3.4.)
The computational robustness of the above construction relies on allowing the hypothesis to some-
times “detect” tampering and output a special symbol ⋆. The goal of the attacker is to make the
hypothesis output a wrong label and not get detected. Therefore, we have proved, along the way,
that allowing tamper detection can also be useful for robustness. Allowing tamper detection, how-
ever, is not always an option. For example a real-time decision making classifier (e.g., classifying a
traffic sign) that has to output a label, even if it detects that something might be suspicious about the
input image. We prove that even in this case, there is a learning problem P with binary labels and
a classifier h for P such that computational risk of h is almost zero, while its information theoretic
risk is ≈ 1/2, which makes classifiers’ decisions under attack meaningless. (See Theorem 3.9).
In summary, our work provides credence that perhaps restricting attacks to computationally bounded
adversaries holds promise for achieving computationally robust machine learning that relies on com-
putational hardness assumptions as is currently done in cryptography.
From computational robustness back to computational hardness. Our first result shows that
computational hardness can be leveraged in some cases to obtain nontrivial computational robustness
that beats information theoretic robustness. But how about the reverse direction; are computational
hardness assumptions necessary for this goal? We also prove such reverse direction and show that
nontrivial computational robustness implies computationally hard problems inNP. In particular, we
show that a non-negligible gap between the success probability of computationally bounded vs. that
of unbounded adversaries in attacking the robustness of classifiers implies strong average-case hard
distributions for class NP. Namely, we prove that if the distribution D of the instances in learning
task is efficiently samplable, and if a classifier h for this problem has computational robustness α,
information theoretic robustness β, and α < β, then one can efficiently sample from a distribution
S that generates Boolean formulas φ← S that are satisfiable with overwhelming probability, yet no
efficient algorithm can find the satisfying assignments of φ ← S with a non-negligible probability.
(See Theorem 4.2 for the formal statement.)
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What world do we live in? As explained above, our main question is whether adversarial exam-
ples could be prevented by relying on computational limitations of the adversary. In fact, even if
adversarial examples exist for a classifier, we might be living in either of two completely differnet
worlds. One is a world in which computationally unbounded adversaries can find adversarial ex-
amples (almost) whenever they exist; and thus, they would be as powerful as information-theoretic
adversaries. Another world is one in which machine learning could leverage computational hard-
ness. Our work suggests that there are problems for which this is true, and thus we are living in
the better world. Whether or not we can achieve computational robustness for practical problems
(such as image classification) that beats their information-theoretic robustness remains an intriguing
open question. A related line of work (Bubeck et al., 2018b,a; Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan, 2019)
studied other “worlds” that we might be living in, and studied whether adversarial examples are
due to the computational hardness of learning robust classifiers. They designed learning problems
demonstrating that in some worlds, robust classifiers might exist, while they are hard to be obtained
efficiently. We note however, that the goal of those works and our work are quite different. They
deal with how computational constraints might be an issue and prevent the learner from reaching
its goal, while our focus is on how such constraints on adversaries can help us achieve robustness
guarantees that are not achievable information theoretically.
Other related work. In another line of work (Raghunathan et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018;
Sinha et al., 2018; Wong et al., 2018) the notion of certifiable robustness was developed to prove
robustness for individual test instances. More formally, they aim at providing robustness certificates
with bounds εx along with a decision h(x) made on a test instance x, with the guarantee that any
x′ at distance at most εx from x is correctly classified. However, these guarantees, so far, are not
strong enough to rule out attacks completely, as larger magnitudes of perturbation (than the levels
certified) still can fool the classifiers while the instances look the same to the human.
Other norms. Our main result of separating computational and information theoretic robustness
(Theorem 3.4) is proved using Hamming distance over Boolean strings (of length ≈ n) which is
equivalent to using ℓ0 norm over the “noise” added to the input. For any Boolean “noise” vector
e ∈ {0, 1}n, we have ‖e‖p = (‖e‖0)
1/p for any 0 ≤ p < ∞ where ‖e‖p is x’s ℓp norm. So, we
immediately get results for other norms as well. Our result of obtaining hardness from computational
robustness (Theorem 4.2) is general and applies to any polynomial time computable metric or norm.
1.1.1 Techniques
We prove our main result about the possibility of computationally robust classifiers (Theorem 3.4)
by “wrapping” an arbitrary learning problemQwith a vulnerable classifier by adding computational
certification based on cryptographic digital signatures to test instances. A digital signature scheme
(see Definition 3.1) operates based on two generated keys (vk, sk), where sk is private and is used
for signingmessages, and vk is public and is used for verifying signatures. Such schemes come with
the guarantee that a computationally bounded adversary with the knowledge of vk cannot sign new
messages on its own, even if it is given signatures on some previous messages. Digital signature
schemes can be constructed based on the assumption that one-way functions exist.4 Below we
describe the ideas behind this result in two steps.
(Initial Attempt). SupposeDQ is the distribution overX×Y of a learning problemQwith input space
X and label space Y . Suppose DQ had a hypothesis hQ that can predict correct labels reasonably
well, Pr(x,y)←DQ [h(x) 6= y] ≤ α. Suppose, at the same time, that a (perhaps computationally
unbounded) adversary A can perturb test instances like x into a close adversarial example x′ that is
now likely to be misclassified by hQ,
Pr
(x,y)←DQ
[h(x′) 6= y;x′ = A(x)] ≥ β ≫ α.
Now we describe a related problem P, its distribution of examplesDP, and a classifier hP for P. To
sample an example from DP, we first sample (x, y) ← DQ and then modify x to x = (x, σx) by
4Here, we need signature schemes with “short” signatures of poly-logarithmic length over the security
parameter. They could be constructed based on exponentially hard one-way functions (Rompel, 1990) by
picking the security parameter sub-exponentially smaller that usual and using universal one-way hash functions
to hash the message to poly-logarithmic length..
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attaching a short signature σx = Sign(sk, x) to x. The label y of x remains the same as that of x.
Note that sk will be kept secret to the sampling algorithm of DP. The new classifier hP will rely
on the public parameter vk that is available to it. Given an input x = (x, σx), hP first checks its
integrity by verifying that the given signature σx is valid for x. If the signature verification does not
pass, hP rejects the input as adversarial without outputting a label, but if this test passes, hP outputs
hQ(x).
To successfully find an adversarial example x′ for hP through a small perturbation of x = (x, σ)
sampled as (x, y) ← DP , an adversary A can pursue either of the following strategies. (I) One
strategy is that A tries to find a new signature σ′ 6= σx for the same x, which will constitute as
a sufficiently small perturbation as the signature is short. Doing so, however, is not considered a
successful attack, as the label of x′ remains the same as that of the true label of the untampered
point x. (II) Another strategy is to perturb the x part of x into a close instance x′ and then trying
to find a correct signature σ′ for it, and outputting x′ = (x′, σ′). Doing so would be a successful
attack, because the signature is short, and thus x′ would indeed be a close instance to x. However,
doing this is computationally infeasible, due to the very security definition of the signature scheme.
Note that (x′σ′) is a forgery for the signature scheme, which a computationally bounded adversary
cannot construct because of the security of the underlying signature scheme. This means that the
computational risk of hP would remain at most α.
We now observe that information theoretic (i.e., computationally unbounded) attackers can succeed
in finding adversarial examples for hP with probability at least β ≫ α. In particular, such attacks
can first find an adversarial example x′ for x (which is possible with probability β over the sampled
x), construct a signature σ′ for x′, and then output (x′, σ′). Recall that an unbounded adversary can
construct a signature σ′ for x′ using exhaustive search.
(Actual construction). Onemain issue with the above construction is that it needs to make vk publicly
available, as a public parameter to the hypothesis (after it is sampled as part of the description of the
distributionDP). The other issue is that the distributionDP is not publicly samplable in polynomial
time, because to get a sample from DP one needs to use the signing key sk, but that key is kept
secret. We resolve these two issues with two more ideas. The first idea is that, instead of generating
one pair of keys (vk, sk) for DP and keeping skD secret, we can generate a fresh pair of keys
(vkx, skx) every time that we sample (x, y) ← DQ and attach vkx also to the actual instance x =
(x, σx, vkk). The modified hypothesis hP also uses this key and verifies (x, σx) using vkx. This way,
the distribution DP is publicly samplable, and moreover, there is no need for making vk available
as a public parameter. However, this change of the distribution DP introduces a new possible way
to attack the scheme and to find adversarial examples. In particular, now the adversary can try to
perturb vkx into a close string vk
′ for which it knows a corresponding signing key sk′, and then use
sk′ to sign an adversarial example x′ for x and output (x′, σ′, vk′). However, to make this attack
impossible for the attacker under small perturbations of instances, we use error correction codes and
employ an encoding [vkx] of the verification key (instead of vkx) that needs too much change before
one can fool a decoder to decode to any other vk′ 6= vkx. But as long as the adversary cannot change
vkx, the adversary cannot attack the robustness computationally. (See Construction 3.3.)
To analyze the construction above (see Theorem 3.4), we note that the computational robustness
of hP can be as high as Ω(n), because the encoded [vk] would need Ω(n) to change the encoded
vk, and if vk remains the same it is hard computationally to do any attack beyond the original risk
of the problem Q (that needs no adversarial perturbations). On the other hand, a computationally
unbounded adversary can focus on perturbing x into x′ and then forge a short signatures for it, which
means b+ |σx| bits of tampering, and this could be as small as poly(logn).
Our construction above has the benefit that it could be defined as a wrapper around any natural
vulnerable classifier. However, the computational robustness of the constructed classifier relies on
sometimes detecting tampering attacks and not outputting a label. We give an alternative construc-
tion for a setting that the classifier always has to output a label. We again use digital signatures as
the main ingredient of our construction, though our construction is no longer wrapped around and
arbitrary natural task. See Construction 3.8 for more details.
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2 Defining Computational Risk and Computationally Robust Learning
Notation. We use calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) for sets and capital non-calligraphic letters (e.g.,
D) for distributions. By d ← D we denote sampling d from D. For a randomized algorithm R(·),
y ← R(x) we denotes the randomized execution of R on input x outputting y. A classification
problem P = (X ,Y,D,H) is specified by the following components: set X is the set of possible
instances, Y is the set of possible labels,D ∈ D is a joint distribution overX×Y , andH is the space
of hypothesis. For simplicity we work with problems that have a single distributionD (e.g.,D is the
distribution of labeled images from a data set like MNIST or CIFAR-10). We did not state the loss
function explicitly, as we work with classification problems and use the zero-one loss by default. For
the fixed distributionD, the risk or error of a hypothesis h ∈ H is Risk(h) = Pr(x,y)←D[h(x) 6= y].
We are usually interested in learning problems P = (X ,Y, D,H) with a specific metric d defined
over X for the purpose of defining adversarial perturbations of bounded magnitude controlled by d.
In that case, we might simply write P = (X ,Y, D,H), but d is implicitly defined over X . Finally,
for a metric d over X , we let db(x) = {x
′ | d(x, x′) ≤ r} be the ball of radius b centered at x
under the metric d. By default, we work with Hamming distance HD(x, x′) = |{i : xi 6= x
′
i}|, but
our definitions can be adapted to any other metrics. We usually work with families of problems Pn
where n determines the length of x ∈ Xn (and thus input lengths of h ∈ Hn, c ∈ Cn,dn).
Allowing tamper detection. In this work we expand the standard notion of hypotheses and allow
h ∈ H to output a special symbol ⋆ as well (without adding ⋆ to Y), namely we have h : X 7→
Y ∪ {⋆}. This symbol can be used to denote “out of distribution” points, or any form of tampering.
In natural scenarios, h(x) 6= ⋆ when x is not an adversarially tampered instance. However, we allow
this symbol to be output by h even in no-attack settings as long as its probability is small enough.
We follow the tradition of game-based security definitions in cryptography (Naor, 2003; Shoup,
2004; Goldwasser & Kalai, 2016; Rogaway & Zhang, 2018). Games are the most common way that
security is defined in cryptography. These games are defined between a challenger Chal and an
adversary A. Consider the case of a signature scheme. In this case the challenger Chal is a signature
scheme Π and an adversary A is given oracle access to the signing functionality (i.e. adversary can
give a messagemi to the oracle and obtains the corresponding signature σi). Adversary A wins the
game if he can provide a valid signature on a message that was not queried to the oracle. The security
of the signature scheme is then defined informally as follows: any probabilistic polynomial time/size
adversary A can win the game by probability that is bounded by a negligible n−ω(1) function on the
security parameter. We describe a security game for tampering adversaries with bounded tampering
budget in HD, but the definition is more general and can be used for other adversary classes.
Definition 2.1 (Security game of adversarially robust learning). Let Pn = (X ,Y, D,H) be a classi-
fication problem where the components are parameterized by n. Let L be a learning algorithm with
sample complexitym = m(n) for P. Consider the following game between a challenger Chal, and
an adversary A with tampering budget b = b(n).
1. Chal samplesm i.i.d. examples S ← Dm and gets hypothesis h← L(S) where h ∈ H.
2. Chal then samples a test example (x, y)← D and sends (x, y) to the adversary A.
3. Having oracle (gates, in case of circuits) access to hypothesis h and a sampler for D, the
adversary obtains the adversarial instance x′ ← Ah(·),D(x) and outputs x′.
Winning conditions: In case x = x′, the adversary A wins if h(x) 6= y,5 and in case x 6= x′, the
adversary wins if all the following hold: (1) HD(x, x′) ≤ b, (2) h(x′) 6= y, and (3) h(x′) 6= ⋆.
Why separating winning case for x = x′ from x 6= x′? One might wonder why we separate
the winning condition for the two cases of x = x′ and x 6= x′. The reason is that ⋆ is supposed
to capture tamper detection. So, if the adversary does not change x and the hypothesis outputs
h(x) = ⋆, this is an error, and thus should contribute to the risk. More formally, when we evaluate
risk, we have Risk(h) = Pr(x,y)←D[h(x) 6= y], which implicitly means that outputting ⋆ contributes
to the risk. However, if adversary’s perturbs to x′ 6= x leads to h(x′) = ⋆, it means the adversary
has not succeeded in its attack, because the tampering is detected. In fact, if we simply require the
5Therefore, if h(x) 6= y, without loss of generality, the adversary A can output x′ = x
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other 3 conditions to let adversary win, the notion of “adversarial risk” (see Definition 2.2) might be
even less than the normal risk, which is counter intuitive.
Alternative definitions of winning for the adversary. The winning condition for the adversary
could be defined in other ways as well. In our Definition 2.1, the adversary wins if d(x, x′) ≤ b and
h(x′) 6= y. This condition is inspired by the notion of corrupted input Feige et al. (2015), is extended
to metric spaces in Madry et al. (2018), and is used in and many subsequent works. An alternative
definition for adversary’s goal, formalized in Diochnos et al. (2018) and used in Gilmer et al. (2018);
Diochnos et al. (2018); Bubeck et al. (2018a); Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan (2019) requires h(x′) to
be different from the true label of x′ (rather than x). This condition requires the misclassification of
x′, and thus, x′ would belong to the “error-region” of h. Namely, if we let c(x) = y be the ground
truth function, the error-region security game requires h(x′) 6= c(x′). Another stronger definition of
adversarial risk is given by Suggala et al. (2018) in which the requirement condition requires both
conditions: (1) the ground truth should not change c(x) = c(x′), and that (2) x′ is misclassified. For
natural distributions like images or voice, where the ground truth is robust to small perturbations, all
these three definitions for adversary’s winning are equivalent.
Stronger attack models. In the attack model of Definition 2.1, we only provided the label y of x
to the adversary and also give her the sample oracle from D. A stronger attacker can have access
to the “concept” function c(x) which is sampled from the distribution of y given x (according to
D). This concept oracle might not be efficiently computable, even in scenarios that D is efficiently
samplable. In fact, even if D is not efficiently samplable, just having access to a large enough pool
of i.i.d. sampled data from D is enough to run the experiment of Definition 2.1. In alternative
winning conditions (e.g., the error-region definition) for Definition 2.1 discussed above, it makes
more sense to also include the ground truth concept oracle c(·) given as oracle to the adversary, as
the adversary needs to achieve h(x′) 6= c(x′). Another way to strengthen the power of adversary
is to give him non-black-box access to the components of the game (see Papernot et al. (2017)).
In definition 2.1, by default, we model adversaries who have black-box access to h(·), D, but one
can define non-black-box (a.k.a. white-box) access to each of h(·), D, if they are polynomial size
objects.
Diochnos et al. (2018) focused on bounded perturbation adversaries that are unbounded in their
running time and formalized notions of of adversarial risk for a given hypothesis h with respect
to the b-perturbing adversaries. Using Definition 2.1, in Definition 2.2, we retrieve the notions of
standard risk, adversarial risk, and its (new) computational variant.
Definition 2.2 (Adversarial risk of hypotheses and learners). Suppose L is a learner for a problem
P = (X ,Y, D,H). For a class of attackers A we define
AdvRiskA(L) = sup
A∈A
Pr[A wins]
where the winning is in the experiment of Definition 2.1. When the attacker A is fixed, we simply
write AdvRiskA(L) = AdvRisk{A}(L). For a trivial attacker I who outputs x
′ = x, it holds that
Risk(L) = AdvRiskI(L). When A includes attacker that are only bounded by b perturbations, we
use notationAdvRiskb(L) = AdvRiskA(L), and when the adversary is further restricted to all s-size
(oracle-aided) circuits, we use notation AdvRiskb,s(L) = AdvRiskA(L). When L is a learner that
outputs a fixed hypothesis h, by substituting h with L, we obtain the following similar notions for h:
Risk(h), AdvRiskA(h), AdvRiskb(h), and AdvRiskb,s(h).
Definition 2.3 (Computationally robust learners and hypotheses). Let Pn = (X ,Y, D,H) be a
family of classification parameterized by n. We say that a learning algorithm L is a computationally
robust learner with risk at most R = R(n) against b = b(n)-perturbing adversaries, if for any
polynomial s = s(n), there is a negligible function negl(n) = n−ω(1) such that
AdvRiskb,s(L) ≤ R(n) + negl(n).
Again, when L is a learner that outputs a fixed hypothesis h for each n, we say that h is a computa-
tionally robust hypothesis with risk at most R = R(n) against b = b(n)-perturbing adversaries, if
L is so. In both cases, we might simply say that L (or h) has computational risk at most R(n).
Discussion (falsifiability of computational robustness). If the learner L is polynomial time, and
that the distribution D is samplable in polynomial time (e.g., by sampling y first and then using a
7
generative model to generate x for y), then the the computational robustness of learners as defined
based on Definitions 2.3 and 2.1 is a “falsifiable” notion of security as defined by Naor (2003).
Namely, if an adversary claims that it can break the computational robustness of the learner L, it
can prove so in polynomial time by participating in a challenge-response game and winning in this
game with a noticeable probability more thanR(n). This feature is due to the crucial property of the
challenger in Definition 2.1 that is a polynomial time algorithm itself, and thus can be run efficiently.
Not all security games have efficient challengers (e.g., see Pandey et al. (2008)).
3 From Computational Hardness to Computational Robustness
In this section, we will first prove our main result that shows the existence of a learning problem
with classifiers that are only computationally robust. We first prove our result by starting from
any hypothesis that is vulnerable to adversarial examples; e.g., this could be any of the numerous
algorithms shown to be susceptible to adversarial perturbations.
Before going over the constructions, we recall some useful tools.
3.1 Useful Tools
Definition 3.1 (One-time signature schemes). A one-time signature scheme S =
(KGen, Sign,Verify) consists of three probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
• KGen(1λ)→ (sk, vk)
• Sign(sk,m)→ σ
• Verify(vk, σ,m)→ {0, 1}
which satisfy the following properties:
1. Completeness: For everym
Pr[(sk, vk)← KGen(1λ);σ ← Sign(sk,m);
Verify(vk, σ,m) = 1] = 1.
2. Unforgeability: For every positive polynomial s, for every λ and every pair of circuits
(A1, A2) with size s(λ) the following probability is negligible in λ:
Pr[(sk, vk)← KGen(1λ);
(m, st)← A1(1
λ, vk);
σ ← Sign(sk,m);
(m′, σ′)← A2(1
λ, vk, st,m, σ);
m 6= m′ ∧ Verify(vk, σ′,m′) = 1].
Definition 3.2 (Error correction codes). An error correction code with code rate α and error rate β
consists of two algorithms Encode and Decode as follows.
• The encode algorithm Encode takes a Boolean string m and outputs a Boolean string c
such that |c| = |m|/α.
• The decode algorithm Decode takes a Boolean string c and outputs either ⊥ or a Boolean
string m. It holds that for all m ∈ {0, 1}∗, c = Encode(m) and c′ where HD(c, c′) ≤
β · |c|, it holds that Decode(c′) = m.
3.2 Computational Robustness with Tamper Detection
Our first construction uses hypothesis with tamper detection (i.e, output ⋆ capability).
Construction 3.3 (Computational robustness using tamper detection). Let Q = ({0, 1}d,Y, D,H)
be a learning problem and h ∈ H a classifier for Q such that Risk(h) = α. We construct a family
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of learning problems P{n∈N} (based on the fixed problem Q) with a family of classifiers h{n∈N}.
In our construction we use signature scheme (KGen, Sign,Verify) for which the bit-length of vk is
λ and the bit-length of signature is ℓ(λ) = polylog(λ) . 6 We also use an error correction code
(Encode,Decode) with code rate cr = Ω(1) and error rate er = Ω(1).
1. The space of instances for Pn is Xn = {0, 1}
n+d+ℓ(n).
2. The set of labels is Yn = Y .
3. The distribution Dn is defined by the following process: first sample (x, y) ← D,
(sk, vk) ← KGen(1n·cr), σ ← Sign(sk, x), then encode [vk] = Encode(vk) and out-
put ((x, σ, [vk]), y).
4. The classifier hn : Xn → Yn is defined as
hn(x, σ, vk
′) =
{
h(x) if Verify
(
Decode(vk′), x, σ
)
,
⋆ otherwise.
Theorem 3.4. For family Pn of Construction 3.3, the family of classifiers hn is computationally
robust with risk at most α against adversaries with budget er · n. On the other hand hn is not robust
against information theoretic adversaries of budget b+ ℓ(n), if h is not robust to b perturbations:
AdvRiskb+ℓ(n)(hn) ≥ AdvRiskb(h).
Theorem 3.4 means that, the computational robustness of hn could be as large as Ω(n) (by choosing
a code with constant error correction rate) while its information theoretic adversarial robustness
could be as small as b + polylog(n) ≤ polylog(n) (note that b is a constant here) by choosing a
signature scheme with short signatures of poly-logarithmic length.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We first prove the following claim about the risk of hn.
Claim 3.5. For problem Pn we have
Risk(hn) = α.
Proof. The proof follows from the completeness of the signature scheme. We have,
Risk(hn) = Pr[((x, σ, [vk]) , y)← Dn; hn(x, σ, [vk]) 6= y]
= Pr[(x, y)← D; h(x) 6= y] = Risk(h).
Now we prove the computational robustness of hn.
Claim 3.6. For family Pn, and for any polynomial s(·) there is a negligible function negl such that
for all n ∈ N
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ α+ negl(n).
Proof. LetA{n∈N} be the family of circuits maximizing the adversarial risk for hn for all n ∈ N. We
build a sequence of circuits A1{n∈N}, A
2
{n∈N} such that A
1
n and A
2
n are of size at most s(n)+poly(n).
A1n just samples a random (x, y) ← D and outputs (x, y). A
2
n gets x, σ and vk, calls An to get
(x′, σ′, vk′) ← An((x, σ, [vk]), y) and outputs (x
′, σ′). Note that A2n can provide all the oracles
needed to run An if the sampler fromD, h and c are all computable by a circuit of polynomial size.
Otherwise, we need to assume that our signature scheme is secure with respect to those oracles and
the proof will follow. We have,
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) = Pr[((x, σ, [vk]), y)← Dn; (x
′, σ′, vk′)← A((x, σ, [vk]), y));
(x′, σ′, vk′) ∈ HDer·n(x, σ, [vk]) ∧ hn(x
′, σ′, vk′) 6= ⋆ ∧ hn(x
′, σ′, vk′) 6= y].
6Such signatures exist assuming exponentially hard one-way functions (Rompel, 1990).
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Note that (x′, σ′, vk′) ∈ HDer·n(x, σ, [vk]) implies that Decode(vk
′) = vk based on the error rate of
the error correcting code. Also hn(x
′, σ′, vk′) 6= ⋆ implies that σ′ is a valid signature for x′ under
verification key vk. Therefore, we have,
AdvRisker·n,s(hn)
≤ Pr[(sk, vk)← KGen(1n); (x, y)← A1(1
n); σ ← Sign(sk, x); (x′, σ′)← A2(x, σ, vk);
Verify(vk, x′, σ′) ∧ hn(x
′, σ′, [vk]) 6= y]
≤ Pr[(sk, vk)← KGen(1n); x← A1(1
n); σ ← Sign(sk, x); (x′, σ′)← A2(x, σ, vk);
Verify(vk, x′, σ′) ∧ x′ 6= x] + Risk(hn).
Thus, by the unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme we have
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ Risk(hn) + negl(n),
which by Claim 3.5 implies
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ α+ negl(n).
Now we show that hn is not robust against computationally unbounded attacks.
Claim 3.7. For family Pn and any n, b ∈ N we have
AdvRiskb+ℓ(n)(hn) ≤ AdvRiskb(h).
Proof. For any ((x, σ, [vk]), y) define A(x, σ, [vk]) = (x′, σ′, [vk]) where x′ is the closes point to
x where h(x) 6= y and σ′ is a valid signature such that Verify(vk, x∗, σ′) = 1. Based on the fact
that the size of signature is ℓ(n), we have HD(A(x, σ, [vk]), (x, σ, [vk])) ≤ ℓ(n) + HD(x, x′). Also,
it is clear that hn(A(x, σ, [vk])) 6= ⋆ because σ
′ is a valid signature. Also, hn(A(x, σ, [vk])) 6=
cn(A(x, σ, [vk])). Therefore we have
AdvRiskb+ℓ(n)(hn)
= Pr[((x, σ, [vk]), y)← Dn; ∃(x
′, σ′) ∈ HDb+ℓ(n)(x, σ), h(x
′) 6= y ∧ h(x′) 6= ⋆ ∧ Verify(vk, σ′, x′)]
≤ Pr[((x, σ, [vk]), y)← Dn; ∃x
′ ∈ HDb(x), h(x
′) 6= y ∧ h(x′) 6= ⋆]
= AdvRiskb(h).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
3.3 Computational Robustness without Tamper Detection
The following theorem shows an alternative construction that is incomparable to Construction 3.3,
as it does not use any tamper detection. On the down side, the construction is not defined with
respect to an arbitrary (vulnerable) classifier of a natural problem.
Construction 3.8 (Computational robustness without tamper detection). Let D be a distribution
over {0, 1}cr·n × {0, 1} with a balanced “label” bit: Pr(x,y)←D[y = 0] = 1/2. We construct
a family of learning problems P{n∈N} with a family of classifiers h{n∈N}. In our construction we
use a signature scheme (KGen, Sign,Verify) for which the bit-length of vk is λ and the bit-length
of signature is ℓ(λ) = polylog(λ) and an error correction code (Encode,Decode) with code rate
cr = Ω(1) and error rate er = Ω(1).
1. The space of instances for Pn is Xn = {0, 1}
2n+n·ℓ(n).
2. The set of labels is Yn = {0, 1}.
3. The distributionDn is defined as follows: first sample (x, y)← D, then sample (sk, vk)←
KGen(1n·cr) and compute [vk] = Encode(vk). Then compute [x] = Encode(x). If y = 0
sample a random σ ← {0, 1}ℓ(n) that is not a valid signature of x w.r.t vk. Then output
(([x], σn, [vk]), 0). Otherwise compute σ ← Sign(sk, x) and output (([x], σn, [vk]), 1).
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4. The classifier hn : Xn → Yn is defined as
hn(x
′, σ1, . . . , σn, vk
′) =
{
1 if ∃i ∈ [n];Verify
(
Decode(vk′),Decode(x′), σi
)
,
0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.9. For family Pn of Construction 3.8, the family of classifiers hn has risk 0 and is
computationally robust with risk at most 0 against adversaries of budget er · n. On the other hand
hn is not robust against information theoretic adversaries of budget ℓ(n):
AdvRiskℓ(n)(hn) ≥ 1/2.
Note that reaching adversarial risk 1/2 makes the classifier’s decisions meaningless as a random
coin toss achieves this level of accuracy.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. First it is clear that for problem Pn we have Risk(hn) = 0. Now we prove
the computational robustness of hn.
Claim 3.10. For family Pn, and for any polynomial s(·) there is a negligible function negl such that
for all n ∈ N
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ negl(n).
Proof. Similar to proof of Claim 3.6 we prove this based on the security of the signature scheme.
Let A{n∈N} be the family of circuits maximizing the adversarial risk for hn for all n ∈ N. We
build a sequence of circuits A1{n∈N} and A
2
{n∈N} such that A
1
n and A
2
n are of size at most s(n) +
poly(n). A1n just asks the signature for 0
cr·n. A2n gets vk and does the following: It first samples
(x, y)← D, computes encodings [x] = Encode(x) and [vk] = Encode(vk) and if y = 0, it samples
a random σ ← {0, 1}ℓ(n) then calls An on input ([x], σ
n, [vk]) to get (x′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′) ←
An(([x], σ
n, [vk]), y). Then it checks all σi’s and if there is any of them that Verify(vk, σi, x) = 1 it
outputs (x, σi), otherwise it aborts and outputs ⊥. If y = 0 it aborts and outputs ⊥. Note that A
2
n
can provide all the oracles needed to run An if the sampler fromD, h and c are all computable by a
circuit of polynomial size. Otherwise, we need to assume that our signature scheme is secure with
respect to those oracles and the proof will follow. We have,
AdvRisker·n,s(hn)
= Pr[(([x], σn, [vk]), y)← Dn; (x
′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′)← An(([x], σ
n, [vk]), y));
(x′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′) ∈ HDer·n([x], σ
n, [vk]) ∧ hn(x
′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′) 6= y].
Note that (x′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′) ∈ HDer·n(x, σ
n, [vk]) implies that Decode(vk′) = vk
and Decode(x′) = x based on the error rate of the error correcting code. Also
hn(x
′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′) 6= y implies that y = 0. This is because if y = 1, the adversary has
to make all the signatures invalid which is impossible with tampering budget cr · n. Therefore y
must be 1 and one of the signatures in (σ1, . . . , σn)must pass the verification because the prediction
of hλ should be 1. Therefore we have
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ Pr[((x, σ
n, [vk]), y)← Dn; (x
′, (σ1, . . . , σn), vk
′)← A((x, σ, [vk]), y));
y = 0 ∧ ∃iVerify(vk, σi, x)]
≤ Pr[(sk, vk)← KGen(1n); 0cr·n ← A1(1
n, vk); σ ← Sign(sk, 0cr·n);
(x, σi)← A2(vk); Verify(vk, x, σi)]
Thus, by the unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme we have
AdvRisker·n,s(hn) ≤ negl(n).
Now we show that hn is not robust against computationally unbounded attacks.
Claim 3.11. For family Pn and any n ∈ N we have
AdvRiskℓ(n)(hn) = 0.5.
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Proof. For any (([x], σn, [vk]), y) define A([x], σn, [vk]) as follows: If y = 1, A does nothing
and outputs ([x], σn, [vk]). If y = 0, A search all possible signatures to find a signature σ′ such
that Verify(vk, σ′, x) = 1. It then outputs ([x], (σ′, σn−1), [vk]). Based on the fact that the size
of signature is ℓ(n), we have HD((x, (σ′, σn−1), [vk]), (x, σn, [vk])) ≤ ℓ(n). Also, it is clear that
hn(x, (σ
′, σn−1), [vk]) = 1 because the first signature is always a valid signature. Therefore we
have
AdvRiskℓ(n)(hn) ≥ Pr[(([x], σ
n, [vk]), y)← Dn;h(A(([x], σ
n, [vk]))) 6= y]
= Pr[(([x], σn, [vk]), y)← Dn; 1 6= y]
= 0.5.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.9.
4 Average-Case Hardness of NP from Computational Robustness
In this section, we show a converse result to those in Section 3, going from useful computational
robustness to deriving computational hardness. Namely, we show that if for there is a learning
problem whose computational risk is noticeably more than its information theoretic risk, then NP
is hard even on average.
Definition 4.1 (Hard samplers for NP). Let SAT be the language of specifiable Boolean formulas.
Suppose S(1n, r) is a polynomial time randomized algorithm that takes 1n and randomness r, runs
in time poly(n), and outputs Boolean formulas. We call S a hard sampler forNP if,
1. For a negligible function negl it holds that Prφ←S [φ ∈ SAT] = 1− negl(n).
2. For every poly-size circuit A, there is a negligible negl, Prφ←S,t←A(φ)[φ(t) = 1] =
negl(n).
The following theorem is stated for computationally robust learning, but the same proof holds for
computationally robust hypotheses as well.
Theorem 4.2 (Hardness of NP from computational robustness). Let Pn = (X ,Y, D,H) be a
learning problem. Suppose there is a (uniform) learning algorithm L for Pn such that:
1. L is computationally robust with risk at most α under b-perturbations.
2. AdvRiskb(L) ≥ β; i.e., information-theoretic adversarial risk of L is at least β.
3. β − α ≥ ε for ε = 1/poly(n).
4. D is efficiently samplable by algorithm SD.
5. Checking d(x, x′) ≤ b is possible in polynomial time.
Then, there is a hard sampler for NP.
Before proving Theorem 4.2, we recall a useful lemma. The same proof of amplification of (weak
to strong) one-way functions by Yao (1982) and described in (Goldreich, 2007), or the parallel
repetition of verifiable puzzles (Canetti et al., 2005; Holenstein & Schoenebeck, 2011) can be used
to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 (Amplification of verifiable puzzles). Suppose S is a distribution over Boolean for-
mulas such that for every poly-size adversary A, for sufficiently large n, it holds that solving the
puzzles generated by S are weakly hard. Namely, Prφ←S(1n,r1)[φ(t) = 1; t ← A(φ)] ≤ ε for
ε = 1/poly(n). Then, for any polynomial-size adversary A, there is a negligible function negl,
such that the probability that A can simultanously solve all of k = n/ε puzzles φ1, . . . , φk that are
independently sampled from S is at most negl(n).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. First consider the following sampler S1. (We will modify S1 later on).
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1. Samplem examples S ← Dm.
2. Run L to get h← L(S).
3. Sample another (x, y)← D
4. Using the Cook-Levin reduction, get a Boolean formula φ = φh,x,y such that φ ∈ SAT, if
(1) d(x′, x′) ≤ b and (2) h(x′) 6= y. This is possible because using h, x, y, both conditions
(1) and (2) are efficiently checkable.
5. Output φ.
By the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, it holds that Prφ←S1 [φ ∈ SAT] ≥ β while for any poly-size
algorithm A, it holds that Prφ←S1,t←A(φ)[φ(t) = 1] ≤ α. So, S1 almost gets the conditions of a
hard sampler forNP, but only with a weak sense.
Using standard techniques, we can amplify the ε-gap between α, β. The algorithm S2 works as
follows. (This algorithm assumes the functions α, β are efficiently computable, or at least there is
an efficiently computable threshold τ ∈ [α+ 1/poly(n), β − 1/poly(n)].)
1. For k = n/ε2, and all i ∈ [k], get φi ← S1.
2. Using the Cook-Levin reduction get a Boolean formula φ = φφ1,...,φk such φ ∈ SAT, if
there is a solution to satisfy at least τ = (α + β)/2 of the formulas φ1, . . . , φk . More
formally, φ ∈ SAT, if there is a vector t = (t1, . . . , tk) such that |{i : φi(ti) = 1}| ≥ τ .
This is possible since verifying t is efficiently possible.
By the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound,
Pr
φ←S2
[φ ∈ SAT] ≥ 1− e−(ε/2)
2·n/ε2 ≥ 1− e−n/4.
Proving the second property of the hard sampler S is less trivial, as it needs an efficient reduction.
However, we can apply a weak bound here and then use Lemma 4.3. We first claim that for any
poly-size adversary A,
Pr
φ←S2,t←A(φ)
[φ(t) = 1] ≤ 1− ε/3. (1)
To prove Equation 1, suppose for sake of contradiction that there is such adversary A. We can use
A and solve φ′ ← S1 with probability more than α + Ω(ε) which is a contradiction. Given φ
′, The
reduction is as follows.
1. Choose i← [k] at random.
2. Sample k − 1 instances φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi+1, . . . , φk ← S1 independently at random.
3. Let φi = φ
′.
4. Ask A to solve φφ1,...,φk , and if A’s answer gave a solution for φi = φ
′, output this solution.
Since A cannot guess i, a simple argument shows that the above reduction succeeds with probability
α + ε/2 − ε/3 = α + ε/6. Now that we have a puzzle generator S2 that has satisfiable puzzles
with probability 1 − negl(n) and efficient algorithms can solve its solutions by probability at most
ε/2, using Lemma 4.3, we can use another direct product and design sampler S that samples 2n/ε
independent instances from S2 and asks for solutions to all of them. Because we already established
that Prφ←S2 [φ ∈ SAT] ≥ 1− negl(n), the puzzles sampled by S are also satisfiable by probability
1−n ·negl(n) = 1−negl(n), but efficient algorithms can still find the solution only with probability
that is negl(n).
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5 Conclusion
The assumption of computationally-bounded adversaries has been the key to modern cryptography.
In fact, without this assumption modern cryptographic primitives would not be possible. This paper
investigates whether this assumption helps in the context of robust learning and demonstrates that is
indeed the case (i.e., computational hardness can be leveraged in robust learning). We hope that this
work is the first-step in leveraging computational hardness in the context of robust learning.
Several intriguing questions remain, such as:
• Our Construction 3.4 takes a natural learning problem, but then it modifies it. Can compu-
tational robustness be achieved for natural problems, such as image classification?
• Theorem 4.2 shows that computational hardness is necessary for nontrivial computational
robustness. However, this does not still mean we can get cryptographic primitives back
from such problems. Can we obtain cryptographically useful primitives, such as one-way
functions, from such computational robustness?
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